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Abstract
Causal inference based on a restricted version of the potential outcomes approach reason-
ing is assuming an increasingly prominent place in the teaching and practice of epidemi-
ology. The proposed concepts and methods are useful for particular problems, but it would
be of concern if the theory and practice of the complete field of epidemiology were to be-
come restricted to this single approach to causal inference. Our concerns are that this theory
restricts the questions that epidemiologists may ask and the study designs that they may
consider. It also restricts the evidence that may be considered acceptable to assess causality,
and thereby the evidence that may be considered acceptable for scientific and public health
decision making. These restrictions are based on a particular conceptual framework for
thinking about causality. In Section 1, we describe the characteristics of the restricted poten-
tial outcomes approach (RPOA) and show that there is a methodological movement which
advocates these principles, not just for solving particular problems, but as ideals for which
epidemiology as a whole should strive. In Section 2, we seek to show that the limitation of
epidemiology to one particular view of the nature of causality is problematic. In Section 3,
we argue that the RPOA is also problematic with regard to the assessment of causality. We
argue that it threatens to restrict study design choice, to wrongly discredit the results
of types of observational studies that have been very useful in the past and to damage
the teaching of epidemiological reasoning. Finally, in Section 4 we set out what we regard
as a more reasonable ‘working hypothesis’ as to the nature of causality and its assessment:
pragmatic pluralism.
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Introduction
From the 1950s up to the late 1990s, epidemiological con-
cepts of causality and causal inference were rooted in the ex-
perience of accepting smoking as a cause of lung cancer.
This involved the integration of diverse pieces of evidence:
epidemiological (of all types), clinical, pathological, patho-
physiological and mechanistic.1,2 Recently however, the
term ‘causal inference’ has come to designate a specific set
of tools and attitudes: in particular, the use of a certain for-
malized kind of counterfactual reasoning, often aided by
directed acyclic graphs (DAGs). One forthcoming text3 is
entitled ‘causal inference’, implying that it covers all of the
field even though it is restricted to this narrow framework.
Associated with this shift is a restriction of the meaning
of ‘causality’.4,5 Proponents of this approach assume and
promote the pre-eminence of the randomized controlled
trial (RCT) for assessing causality; other study designs (i.e.
observational studies) are then only considered valid and
relevant to the extent that they emulate RCTs.
In this paper, we wish to forestall the emergence of a
‘hardline’ methodological school within epidemiology, one
which we feel would damage the discipline if it became the
dominant paradigm.
Section 1. The ‘restricted’potential outcomes approach
The ‘hardline’ methodological approach which we are
opposing is sometimes termed the ‘potential outcomes ap-
proach’ (POA). However, this term is used in several differ-
ent senses in epidemiology. Often it is introduced as being
interchangeable with counterfactual thinking [p. 54],6
which does not inherently involve interventions (see
‘Family Tree’ below). However, in practice and in terms of
statistical theory, the POA is also often used in terms of
discussing randomized controlled trials (RCTs) or hypo-
thetical interventions [p. 55, 59].6 It is this latter approach
which we are addressing here. Therefore, to avoid confu-
sion with more general versions of the POA, we will use
the term ‘restricted potential outcomes approach’ (RPOA)
to denote the paradigm that we are considering. The
RPOA differs from the POA in two key respects, which we
will identify shortly, having first explained the elements of
the RPOA.
There are two senses in which the term RPOA might be
used. The technical sense concerns a collection of mathem-
atical tools and methods (e.g. directed acyclic graphs
(DAGs), structural equations, marginal structural models—
which are, of course, also advocated outside the RPOA) and
implies no particular philosophical commitment. The philo-
sophical sense, on the other hand, comprises a restrictive set
of convictions about how epidemiologists should think
about causality.
Methodological movements rarely adhere to a single
‘bible’ of agreed claims. This is true of the great methodo-
logical movements of recent times, such as logical positivism,
and it is true of the RPOA too. To proceed and to make clear
that we are not attacking a ‘straw man’, we have identified a
small number of key quotes from prominent authors of this
approach in epidemiology and have identified the logical con-
sequences of these claims.
Epidemiology seeks to be precise and quantitative, but
we do not have a precise—let alone quantitative—definition
of causation, notwithstanding thousands of years of trying.
Epidemiologists thus find themselves in the awkward pos-
ition of wanting to say, in precise quantitative terms, things
that humankind has so far only been able to say vaguely
and qualitatively.
One response to this conundrum is to speak only of asso-
ciations. The RPOA can be seen as a response to this ‘retreat
to the associational haven’.4 According to the RPOA, it is
possible to make precise causal claims so long as we restrict
our attention to causal claims that are well defined:
Key Messages
• The ‘causal inference’ movement that is becoming dominant in theoretical epidemiology in the 21st century and calls
itself ‘counterfactual’, is in fact a combination of counterfactual, interventionist and contrastivist schools of thought
about causality.
• It is an insufficient basis for thinking about causality because it is restricted to one philosophical (sub)school, at the
expense of other notions about causality that have shown to be relevant and useful in practice in epidemiology.
• It is also an insufficient basis for practical causal inference in epidemiology and biomedicine since it does not take
into account the need to integrate diverse types of evidence to assess causality.
• Although the techniques of the new ‘causal inference’ movement have been useful for solving some complex epi-
demiological problems, these apply to particular problems in particular settings, and they are an insufficient basis for
teaching epidemiology.
• The teaching of epidemiology should remain rooted in the quest to find solutions to problems, rather than to adhere to one
school of thought about causality; epidemiologists need ‘pragmatic pluralism’ about causality to think, to teach and to work.
2 International Journal of Epidemiology, 2016, Vol. 0, No. 0
 at London School of H
ygiene &
 Tropical M
edicine on A
pril 27, 2016
http://ije.oxfordjournals.org/
D
ow
nloaded from
 
The alternative to retreating into the associational
haven is to take the causal bull by the horns . . . A
proper definition of a causal effect requires well-defined
counterfactual outcomes, that is a widely shared con-
sensus about the relevant interventions.4
In a plenary talk to the 2014 World Congress of
Epidemiology, Hernan argued that ‘causal questions are
well-defined when interventions are well-specified’.
According to this view, the term ‘intervention’ is used to
indicate an action that we humans could in principle take,
which would bring about the contrasting, non-actual state
of affairs. Thus, the RPOA becomes restricted by the need
for potential ‘human intervention’.
The RPOA does not promote this way of posing and an-
swering causal questions as a universal philosophical analysis,
but as a way of thinking about causality that is useful for epi-
demiologists. The usefulness comes from the predictive value
of causal claims that are relative to specified interventions.
VanderWeele and Hernan explain:
Empirical associations uncovered by statistical analysis
in observational epidemiology and in the social sciences
also allow for prediction. As we observe associations we
can sometimes predict what might happen to a particular
individual given certain covariates or given the past.
However, the associations that are discovered in such ob-
servational research do not in general allow for predic-
tion under contrary to fact scenarios, e.g. under certain
manipulations to set things to other than they were. The
causal inference literature in statistics, epidemiology, the
social sciences etc., attempts to clarify when predictions
of contrary to fact scenarios are warranted. We describe
associations as ‘causal’ when the associations are such
that they allow for accurate prediction of what would
occur under some intervention or manipulation.’7
The RPOA therefore equates causal claims with precise
predictions about contrary-to-fact scenarios that would be
brought about by some intervention or manipulation.
So far, the RPOA presents itself as an attractive view. It
identifies an advantage of causal claims over associational
ones, namely prediction under hypothetical scenarios; and
it advocates restricting our attention to causal claims that
clearly specify such hypothetical scenarios. It further re-
stricts the hypothetical scenarios to those we can humanly
bring about, again apparently because of a motivation of
pragmatism. Hernan writes:
The crucial question is then this: What is the point of
estimating a causal effect that is not well defined? The
resulting relative risk estimate will not be helpful to ei-
ther scientists, who will be unable to relate it to a mech-
anism, or policy makers, who will be unable to translate
it into effective interventions.4
VanderWeele writes:
In this book, as well as within the causal inference frame-
work that has come to dominate in statistics, epidemi-
ology, and the social sciences, causation is typically con-
ceived of in terms of contrasts in the counterfactual
outcomes. These counterfactual outcomes are themselves
typically conceived of as the outcomes under hypothetical
interventions; and the hypothetical interventions that give
rise to counterfactuals usually consist of some human
action; for example, a person takes drug A versus drug
B . . . [p. 452] It is easier to imagine the rest of the universe
being just as it is if a patient took pill A rather than pill B
than it is trying to imagine what else in the universe
would have had to be different if the temperature yester-
day had been 30 degrees instead of 40 [p. 455].8
The RPOA does not oppose non-experimental (observa-
tional) studies in principle, but it recommends that they
should seek to emulate randomized experiments. This is
not only because the latter are randomized (although that
is of course one reason); it is also because they are experi-
ments, and thus involve an intervention. Hernan and
Robins specify that:
An observational study can be conceptualized as a con-
ditionally randomized experiment under the following
three conditions: (i) the values of treatment under com-
parison correspond to well-defined interventions;
(ii) the conditional probability of receiving every value
of treatment, though not decided by the investigators,
depends only on the measured covariates; (iii) the
conditional probability of receiving every value of treat-
ment is greater than zero, i.e. positive [Chapter 3.1].3
From these passages we draw the following claims as char-
acterising the RPOA.
i. Causal claims allow prediction under hypothetical
scenarios, provided the causal claims are well defined.
ii. Causal claims and questions are well defined when
interventions are well specified.
iii. Epidemiologists should restrict their attention to well-
defined causal hypotheses, whose hallmark is well-
defined interventions.
iv. Except for randomization, observational studies should
emulate all aspects of experimental studies because
doing so restricts observational studies to investigating
well-defined causal hypotheses.
These principles bear little resemblance to the incredibly
rich and successful historical practice of epidemiology.
Nor are they endorsed by everyone who works on causal
inference.
The RPOA differs from a more general POA in two key
respects. First, the RPOA insists that interventions or
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manipulations must be humanly feasible manipulations, in
order to be of interest to epidemiology. Second, the RPOA
denies the meaningfulness and usefulness of causal claims
that do not readily yield predictions under hypothetical
scenarios. By contrast, other approaches typically seek to
offer a framework for accommodating and making sense
of such claims.9
Aside from these fundamental conceptual differences,
there are other differences too. For instance, Judea Pearl,
whose work is claimed to be an inspiration for the RPOA,
does not subscribe to the idea that observational studies
should emulate randomized trials, nor to the idea that non-
manipulable factors such as sex and race should not be
regarded as causes, as exemplified in the following quotes
from his work:
Surely we have causation without manipulation. The
moon causes tides, race causes discrimination and sex
causes the secretion of certain hormones and not others.
Nature is a society of mechanisms that relentlessly sense
the values of some variables and determine the value of
others; it does not wait for a human manipulator before
activating those mechanisms [p. 361].10
. . . The essential ingredient of causation is responsive-
ness, namely, the capacity of some variables to respond
to variations in other variables, regardless of how those
variations came about [p. 313].11
. . . It is for that reason, perhaps, that scientists invented
counterfactuals; it permits them to state and conceive
the realization of antecedent conditions without specify-
ing the physical means by which these conditions are es-
tablished [p. 361].10
Thus, it is clear that the RPOA is an entity of its own.
Elements of the RPOA approach
The RPOA draws inspiration from at least three distinct
developments in three distinct disciplines. The first is the
pragmatic attitude to causality adopted by epidemiologists
studying smoking and lung cancer. The first expression of
an explicitly pragmatic approach was perhaps articulated
by Lilienfeld in 1957:
In medicine and public health it seems reasonable to
adopt a pragmatic concept of causality. One major rea-
son for determining etiological factors of human disease
is to use this knowledge to prevent the disease.
Therefore, a factor may be defined as a cause of a dis-
ease, if the incidence of the disease is diminished when
exposure to this factor is likewise diminished.12
This focus on the ‘cash value’ of causal claims for epidemi-
ologists is also evident in the attitudes of present-day advo-
cates of the RPOA, who advocate restricting attention to
those factors which we can intervene on.
The second source of inspiration is the counterfactual ap-
proach to causality. In the 1970s and 80s, philosophers like
David Lewis sought to give counterfactuals clear meaning—
and to use them to analyse causation.13–16 Donald Rubin’s
seminal paper coining the phrase ‘potential outcomes’ was
published in 1974.17 Decades later, more direct links be-
tween philosophical and statistical thinking about causation
were developed by Spirtes, Glymour and Scheines18 and by
Pearl.10,19
Pearl asserts that causality has been mathematized10 al-
though, as noted above, he adopts a more inclusive attitude
towards causal claims than advocates of the RPOA in epi-
demiology. Pearl’s framework has direct and explicit con-
nections with Lewis’s philosophical work. First, the ‘do’
operator can only be made sense of in a philosophical cli-
mate that permits talk about non-actual events. Second,
Pearl’s directed acyclic graphs (DAGs) are similar in ap-
pearance and operation to the neuron diagrams developed
by Lewis and his students, albeit governed by a more expli-
cit set of rules and allowing variables to take numerical
values. Third, Pearl explicitly seeks to harmonize his pro-
posed framework with Lewis’s metaphysics.10,19 Pearl’s
most striking philosophical contribution is his marriage of
the counterfactual and probabilistic approaches to caus-
ation. This offers the hope of deducing testable differences
between competing hypotheses. The toolkit offered by
Pearl has been extended by epidemiologists to remarkable
effect, with certain problems that were previously intract-
able, or at least headache-inducing, being elegantly
resolved.20,21 In the RPOA some epidemiologists have
gone one step further, to use the toolkit as a framework for
expressing causal hypotheses precisely and to insist that
any causal claim that cannot be expressed in this frame-
work is not a well-defined causal claim at all, for epidemio-
logical purposes.
Philosophers have discussed in detail and at length the
semantic interpretation of counterfactual concepts.13,22
Epidemiologists, however, are more interested in the epis-
temology of counterfactuals, i.e. how they lead to assess-
ment of causality. That is perhaps a reason why the
language of ‘potential outcomes’ is often preferred.23One
simply imagines that one has knowledge about the out-
come of two different treatments (levels of exposure) in the
same individual17—and avoids the philosophical complex-
ities of ‘possible worlds’.
The RPOA’s family tree
It is helpful to situate the RPOA within a ‘family tree’ of
theories of causation (Figure 1). At the top level, we have a
number of broad conceptual approaches to causation—
including difference-making theories, regularity theories,
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probabilistic approaches, singularist approaches and dispo-
sitional analyses, among several others. Each of these
approaches has received extensive treatment in the philo-
sophical literature. A useful and up-to-date guide is the
Oxford Handbook of Causation, which discusses them
all.24
The RPOA is part of the family of difference-making
theories of causation, which share the idea that causes are
events which make a difference to their effects, in the sense
that had the cause been different or absent (in some sense
specified by the theory in question), the effect would also
have been different or absent.
Among difference-making theories, it is possible to dis-
tinguish three broad lines of thought, at the next ‘level’ in
the family tree. (These levels have no special significance;
the lines in the figure are merely a heuristic aid in under-
standing how the various philosophical views relate to each
other.) First there is the traditional counterfactual theory of
causation, as advocated by Lewis, according to which a
cause is something such that, had it been absent, the effect
would also have been absent (for at least some individ-
uals).15 For example: ‘Had she not been obese, she would
not have developed a myocardial infarction.’ Second there is
contrastivism, which holds that causation is not a relation
between cause and effect alone, but a four-way relation be-
tween cause, effect, contrast for the cause and contrast for
the effect.25 Third, the interventionist line of thought holds
that the notion of causation is closely related to the notion
of an intervention [p. 20–25]26—a cause is something upon
which we can imagine intervening to alter an outcome (e.g.
how would the incidence of myocardial infarction differ,
due to an intervention to make obese persons lean?). The
contrastivist and interventionist views share the idea that
causal thinking involves explicit thinking about the con-
trasting states of affairs that are being considered. They dif-
fer from the counterfactual view (with which they are
sometimes wrongly conflated) which lets the semantics gov-
erning counterfactual conditionals dictate what happens in
the absence of the cause. The interventionist and contrasti-
vist views differ from each other in that the contrastivist is
offering a semantic thesis—that is, a theory about the mean-
ing of causal claims,25 whereas the interventionist is more
interested in explicating the use of the causal concept in
causal reasoning (inference, explanation, prediction).26
The RPOA falls clearly into the interventionist camp, but
this can be subdivided again. On one side there are in-
principle interventionists. They believe that the notion of an
intervention is not confined to what is humanly possible.
Humans cannot cause an earthquake, but an earthquake
could nevertheless be an intervention. The more restrictive
kind of interventionist view we might call humanly feasible
interventionism. This is the view that causes correspond to
interventions that humans can actually make. It is here that
the RPOA in epidemiology locates itself. Thus, for example,
Greenland uses an earthquake as an example of an event that
is not an intervention, on the basis that it cannot be brought
about by humans.27 In contrast, for an in-principle interven-
tionist such as James Woodward, it is easy to imagine an
earthquake as part of a counterfactual causal history.
In fact, the general POA is not logically committed to hu-
manly feasible interventionism, but RPOA advocates have
tended to assume this commitment. Note that we have not
included the more general POA in the figure since, as noted
above, it could be included with the counterfactual approach
or the interventionist approach (as is the RPOA), depending
on which version of the POA is adopted. For example, a
number of RPOA theorists have treated it as obvious that
race and sex are ‘non-manipulable’.7,28 Thus we proceed on
the basis that a commitment to humanly feasible interven-
tionism is part of the RPOA in epidemiology.
The RPOA thus represents a heavy bet on a very specific
philosophical stance. This stance largely mirrors the point
of view that only randomized controlled trials can assess
causality, even though the history of epidemiology indicates
that this narrow approach to causality has rarely, if ever,
been valid or useful.29 In our view, such a restrictive ap-
proach is unwise; in epidemiology the stakes are high, and
in philosophy the odds are bad for any given theory being
correct, in the sense of being applicable to all instances that
are judged ‘causal’.
Section 2. Why the RPOA is wrong in theory
In this section we explore some of the theoretical inadequa-
cies (and errors) of the RPOA.
The problem of unfeasible interventions
The problem of restricting science to studying feasible
human interventions is that there are clearly causes that
are not (or do not correspond to) feasible human
Difference -
making
Regularity Probabilistic Singularist Dispositional Etc…
InterventionistCounterfactual
(e.g. Lewis)
Contrastivist
(e.g. Schaffer)
Humanly feasible 
interventionist
(RPOA approach 
in epidemiology)
In-principle 
interventionist
(e.g. Woodward)
Figure 1. Fitting the restricted potential outcomes approach (RPOA), as
advocated in epidemiology, in a family tree of theories on causality.
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interventions. Moving tectonic plates cause earthquakes;
heat waves cause deaths; mutations cause drug resistance;
being born with two X chromosomes causes lower salaries.
In each case, we can specify perfectly good (counterfactual)
values that the relevant variables could take: no earth-
quake; no heat wave; cell division without mutation; being
born with an XY pair of chromosomes. At this moment,
there is no humanly feasible way to bring about any of
these things. However, these limits change over time: it
was once not feasible to intervene on blood cholesterol,
and now it is. Perhaps fracking will cause earthquakes.
These issues have been highlighted in recent papers
about whether race and sex are causes,7,28 which describe
an RPOA account that is limited to humanly feasible inter-
ventions. Actually having a second X chromosome is asso-
ciated with particular actual outcomes, such as higher
examination marks, lesser wages, receiving tenure less
often etc. However, it is not feasible to intervene on a per-
son’s sex at the relevant life stage merely to improve exam-
ination marks or to produce more equal wages. For this
reason, RPOA theorists regard antecedents of the following
sort as imprecise: ‘If Jane had been a man . . . ’ The absence
of any feasible intervention that would bring this change
about means, for them, that the hypothetical scenario of
Jane’s non-womanhood is not well specified, and thus that
causal effects are hard to conceptualize and quantify.
There are two difficulties with this stance. The first is
that the boundary around the humanly feasible is not sharp;
it can and does change over time. Indeed, a typical target of
medical research is to bring causes that we cannot currently
intervene upon under our control. Hypercholesterolaemia
was held to be a cause of cardiovascular diseases, long be-
fore effective treatment by statins existed.30 Today, BRCA1
and BRCA2 are causes upon which we cannot intervene.
Maybe we will one day intervene upon these. Since choles-
terol can now be lowered with statins, it is straightforward
to accept it as a cause. In future we may be able to intervene
on BRCA1 and BRCA2 or in their biological pathways; but
the cases of hypercholesterolaemia and BRCA1 and 2 are
parallel, since there was a time when neither could be inter-
vened upon. If they are parallel, then it follows that BRCA1
and BRCA2 are causes. This illustrates a logical flaw in the
attempt to count only humanly feasible interventions as
causes. It is only by disrespecting that boundary that med-
ical science will be able to shift it.
The second problem arising from the RPOA’s stand on
unfeasible interventions is that it represents a confusion be-
tween what we can conceptualize and what we can do. If
the objection were that no possible counterfactual value
could be assigned to ‘If Jane had been a man . . . ’ then,
within a framework that insists on analysing causal claims
counterfactually, it would be correct to assert that the cor-
responding causal claim is meaningless. However, the mere
fact that we cannot bring it about that Jane-like people be
born a different sex does not mean that we cannot imagine
a world in which Jane (more precisely, Jane’s counterpart)
was born a man. In order for an intervention to be well
specified (the POA prerequisite for causal claims to be well
defined), it is not necessary that the intervention can be
done. There is a difference between specifying and doing.
We conclude that the commitment to human feasibility is
something that the RPOA would be better off without.
The ‘states’ problem
A further problem with the RPOA approach is that it can-
not adequately deal with ‘states’ such as obesity as causes.
Hernan and Taubman suggest that obesity could never be
studied as a cause under RPOA precepts:
In an observational study, we do not know the actual
procedure by which each subject achieved a BMI of 20;
thus, the counterfactual outcome . . . . when assigned to a
BMI of 20 is too vague a concept. An immediate conse-
quence of a vague counterfactual outcome is that any
causal contrast involving that counterfactual outcome
will be ill defined.5
When ‘states’ like obesity (or hypercholesterolaemia,
hypertension, carrying BRCA1 or BRCA2, male gender) can
no longer be seen as causes, this is another departure
from successful historical epidemiological practice (see
Lilienfeld’s quote above). The epidemiologist will no longer
be a student of aetiologic factors, but only of interventions.
The specificity problem
The deeper problem with the RPOA concerns its reliance
on the notion of a well-specified intervention, whether hu-
manly feasible or not.
Hernan and Taubman point out that, if one sets about
reducing the BMI of a group of obese people, one may have a
different effect on mortality depending on how one inter-
venes5—e.g. exercise, liposuction, etc. They argue that one
can only make a meaningful causal claim if one has a specific
intervention in mind. Thus one cannot say that 100 000
deaths annually are attributable to obesity; one must say that
100 000 deaths among obese people could be prevented by
exercise—50 000 by diet, 120 000 by a combination, none at
all by liposuction and so forth. This leads Hernan and
Taubman to assert that obesity is not a well-defined cause,
whereas overeating or lack of exercise or a combination of
the two are all well-defined causes. The difficulty is that
‘well-specified intervention’ is itself in need of definition.
6 International Journal of Epidemiology, 2016, Vol. 0, No. 0
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There are many difficulties with the claim that causation is
well defined only when interventions are well specified.
The first difficulty is that the interventions specified by
Hernan and Taubman are open to exactly the same kind of
critique that they direct at the notion that obesity is a
cause. The way that you perform one hour of strenuous
physical exercise per day (e.g. running, cycling, playing
rugby, boxing), or restrict calories, may have a huge im-
pact on mortality. So the argument proposed in their paper
is an instance of double standards.
A second, related difficulty is that often one does not
know in advance whether an intervention is well specified.
Perhaps all aerobic exercise has the same effect; perhaps all
running has the same effect; perhaps all interval training;
and so forth. But on the RPOA, we cannot decide whether
causal questions about the effect of—say—running on
obesity-related mortality are well defined until we have an-
swered the question as to whether running is a well-speci-
fied intervention. And we cannot do that until we have
answered the question as to whether—say—sprinting, as
opposed to middle-distance running, is a well-specified
intervention. And we cannot do that until we have found
out whether 100-m sprinting as opposed to 200-m is a
well-specified intervention. And so forth, ad infinitum. We
are paralysed; we cannot ask a well-defined causal ques-
tion without first answering an infinite series of questions
concerning specification of the interventions.31
Third, there are some cases where the exact nature of
the intervention does not seem very important provided it
achieves its goal. In such cases, precisely specifying an
intervention would be a waste of time. Hypertension arises
from a number of quite diverse mechanisms (renal, cardiac,
vascular), and different drug treatments exist with different
mechanisms (diuretics, calcium channel blockers, angioten-
sin antagonists etc.). By and large, whatever drug treat-
ment and whatever the underlying mechanism for the
hypertension, lowering blood pressure has the desired
beneficial consequences.32
In sum, the situation is much more complex than a sim-
ple insistence on exact specification implies. Because
the RPOA refuses to acknowledge the meaningfulness
or usefulness of causal claims that do not lend them-
selves to well-specified interventions, these theoretical
problems gives rise to practical problems, to which we
now turn.
Section 3. Why the RPOA is wrong in practice
In the previous section we argued that the RPOA’s view of
the nature of causality is overly restrictive. In this section,
we reject the RPOA’s view of causal inference. Although
the arguments of the two sections do not depend upon
each other, they are motivated by similar concerns and
lead to similar conclusions.
The importance of ‘bad’ evidence
Our first practical criticism of the RPOA is that, in effect, it
ranks evidence in a way that ignores the context-dependence
of evidence. A piece of evidence which, on its own, is very
poor evidence for causality, might be a keystone of a larger
structure that makes a very strong case for causality.
This is illustrated by the original rejection of Fisher’s
constitutional hypothesis that a tendency to smoke was
‘constitutionally’ linked to the tendency to develop lung
cancer. This hypothesis can only be refuted by a long-term
randomized trial of smoking starting from youth until mid-
dle and older age. The closest that analytical epidemiology
might come is to study monozygotic twins discordant for
smoking. Such a study was eventually conducted, and
found an excess of lung cancer in the smokers, but came
much too late (1996) to influence the debate.33 The actual
rejection of the constitutional hypothesis in the 1950s
hinged upon time trend-data.34,35 The incidence of lung
cancer had increased over only a few decades. Smoking be-
came widespread in the first half of the 20th century.
According to the constitutional hypothesis, people with a ten-
dency to develop lung cancer would have taken up smoking,
but that would not have changed the prevalence of the ‘linked’
genetic variant that increases the risk of lung cancer.
Moreover, it is inconceivable that a genetic mutation would
have increased that much in prevalence in a few decades—so
the population incidence of lung cancer should have remained
stable. The conclusion was that a new environmental factor
that causes lung cancer must have been introduced.
Time-trend data are in themselves extremely weak evi-
dence for causality. They certainly do not conform to any
RCT-like emulation of a hypothetical intervention.
However, in this situation, they were an essential part of the
evidence for the smoking hypothesis because they were very
good evidence against a competing explanation, the consti-
tutional hypothesis. They provided an important piece of
the ‘crossword’ of overlapping evidence.36 This example il-
lustrates the dangers of crude attempts to ‘rank’ evidence:
the value of evidence for assessing causality is context de-
pendent. The RPOA makes no provision for this.
The importance of ruling out alternatives
One central scientific mode of argument for a given hy-
pothesis is to identify the most plausible alternative
hypotheses, and then find evidence which rules them out.
This idea is well explored by philosophers (e.g. Karl
Popper). Peter Lipton’s framework of inference to the best
explanation places the ruling out of competing hypotheses
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at the centre of scientific inference.37 Similarly, Alex
Broadbent’s model of causal inference and prediction in
epidemiology emphasizes ruling out alternative hypotheses
so as to arrive at ‘stable’ results.38,39
Epidemiologists have also pointed out that ruling out al-
ternative hypotheses is an important way to assess a hy-
pothesis. In 1959, Cornfield stated:
If important alternative hypotheses are compatible with
available evidence, then the question is unsettled, even
if the evidence is experimental. But, if only one hypoth-
esis can explain all the evidence, then the question is set-
tled, even if the evidence is observational.40
Similar reasoning was used by Austin Bradford Hill1 in his
nine causal inference considerations. According to Hill,
one underlying idea was pivotal:
None of my nine viewpoints can bring indisputable evi-
dence for or against the cause and effect hypothesis and
none can be required as a sine qua non. What they can
do, with greater or less strength, is to help us to make
up our minds on the fundamental question—is there
any other way of explaining the set of facts before us, is
there any other answer equally, or more, likely than
cause and effect?1
The value of time-trend data in the example just discussed
is precisely that it rules out alternatives. The RPOA makes
no provision for this.
The importance of triangulation, negative controls
and interlocking evidence
The RPOA provides no model for overcoming what is ar-
guably the central challenge of epidemiology, namely the
challenge of using different kinds of evidence to arrive at
one overall verdict.
One time-honoured strategy, both within and outside
epidemiology, is triangulation: one’s confidence in a find-
ing increases if different data, investigators, theoretical
approaches and methods all converge on that finding.41
For example, when the same association holds in an ana-
lysis with a propensity score and with an instrumental vari-
able analysis that is subject to very different assumptions,
the potential causality of the association is strongly bol-
stered.42 In contrast, the RPOA focuses on individual study
design and does not account for the power of triangula-
tion, nor guide epidemiologists seeking to implement this
approach.
Negative controls can help to assess and quantify
Cornfield’s ‘competing explanations’. The two main types
of negative controls are: exposure controls and outcome
controls.43 An interesting example was the finding of an in-
fluence of smoking habits on pregnancy outcomes. It might
be argued that this might be due to other characteristics of
smoking pregnant women. However, smoking by fathers
had very little relation to the same pregnancy outcomes,
which strongly points to an effect of smoking and not of
putative other characteristics.44 Even if studies that use
negative controls are constructed around RPOA principles,
the idea of using negative controls, and which negative
controls are most valuable, does not arise from RPOA
principles but from background knowledge; furthermore,
the value of also considering evidence from such negative
control studies is not covered by RPOA principles.
Interlocking of evidence happens when epidemiology
draws on evidence from other sciences. In the 1959 paper
on smoking and lung cancer, the authors did not only dis-
cuss epidemiological data; they examined other evidence:
pathology (carcinoma in situ and epithelial dysfunction in
lungs of smokers), animal experiments (high doses of to-
bacco-tar on skin), human observations of tar as a carcino-
gen (chimney sweeps).34,35 Laboratory evidence provides a
useful complement to epidemiological studies, and is an
important part of the overall evidence about causation. It
is illustrative to discuss one biochemical explanation of
why smoking causes lung cancer: it was found in vitro that
benzo[a]pyrenes from tobacco smoke bind to mutation
hotspots of a p53 suppressor gene in cultured lung cells.45
However, this does not establish causality by itself—if we
had no knowledge of the epidemiology of smoking and
lung cancer, there would be no point in pursuing such bio-
chemical studies as their outcomes would be meaning-
less.46 There is no logical difference between a laboratory
experiment of this kind that needs epidemiology as a back-
ground and an epidemiological inference based on observa-
tional data that is strengthened by such laboratory
findings: in both cases, causal inference requires going be-
yond the data from the particular study and integrating the
messages of two different fields of science into one comple-
mentary narrative.
Considering the huge field of possible evidence that
might be relevant to the assessment of a causal hypothesis,
it is an illusion that one might solve the problem of causal-
ity by methods alone. The philosopher Susan Haack uses
the analogy of a crossword puzzle to describe the idea of
integrating particular findings from diverse disciplines with
existing knowledge.36 Triangulation and interlocking of evi-
dence are eminently practical: e.g. in the assessment of car-
cinogens by the IARC, combining animal studies,
mechanistic reasoning and diverse kinds of epidemiology.47
Do these approaches fit with the RPOA?
We have argued that the importance of evidence depends
upon context, and that ruling out alternatives is a central
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method of causal inference. By using triangulation (e.g.
negative controls) and interlocking evidence, observational
studies can help us make very strong causal inferences by
ruling out alternative explanations, even where those stud-
ies do not emulate RCTs and do not clearly specify a no-
tional intervention. The RPOA focuses on particular study
designs and analyses as crucial to causal inference. It can-
not explain the value of ‘bad’ evidence in the total picture;
it does not provide a way of constructing triangulation or
interlocking frameworks of evidence, nor an explanation
of how such frameworks can be so powerful or the import-
ance of ruling out alternatives.
Thus, the RPOA provides a view of causal inference
that is inadequate to both the practice and the theory of
causal inference in epidemiology. In practice, the RPOA
promotes an unwarranted restriction of the type of evi-
dence that is ‘acceptable’, and hence a restriction of the
type of questions that epidemiologists may ask.48
Section 4. Pragmatic pluralism
We argue that a better option for epidemiologists is to
adopt a pragmatic pluralism about concepts of causality.
It is helpful to distinguish the concept of causation from
the nature of causation. In epidemiology, taking a strong
philosophical position about the nature of causation is not
necessary or useful. Epidemiologists do, however, need to
operate with concepts of causality, since they need to em-
ploy causal concepts. We follow Glymour and Glymour in
understanding the RPOA as having latched onto one par-
ticular concept of causality at the expense of others:
There is a counterfactual/interventionist notion of
causation—of use when one is designing a public policy
to intervene and solve a problem—and an historical, or
more exactly, etiological notion—often of use when one
is identifying a problem to solve.49
A consequence of the view by Glymour and Glymour is
that ‘states’ like hypertension, hypercholesterolaemia or dia-
betes can be studied as causes, which conforms with a long
and successful tradition in epidemiology and biomedicine.
Thus, we recommend a pluralistic approach regarding
causal concepts. Epidemiologists should recognise that there
are different ways of thinking about causality, and they
should use the approach that seems most apt for the epi-
demiological problem at hand. Sometimes, asking ‘What
intervention is this putative causal effect meant to be relative
to?’ could be revealing and helpful; sometimes it might be
unnecessary, irrelevant or even unhelpful. Pluralism about
the concept of causation is not entirely uncontentious, but it
is far less philosophically restrictive than any view about the
nature of causation: it is very plausible that we think about
causation in more than one way.50
There already exists a view called ‘causal pluralism’,51
which concerns the nature of causation. However, that is
not what we mean here by ‘pragmatic pluralism’, since
we do not believe that epidemiologists need to take a
stance on the nature of causation. Our pragmatic pluralism
is a combination of quietism about the nature of causation,
and pluralism about causal concepts. Rather than
committing to the hilt to a very specific philosophical view
(especially one with well-established difficulties), epidemi-
ologists should keep an open mind as to what exactly the
nature of causality is, and work with whatever concept
seems most useful from whatever philosophical theories
they encounter.
We note that Pearl’s structural causal models (SCM)
framework is broader than POA and RPOA. He makes
unifying claims for his SCM framework, arguing that the
views of Lewis, Suppes, Woodward, Dawid and others can
be expressed in this framework.52 If so, one might wonder
whether the SCM removes the need for a pragmatic plural-
ism. However, not all of those whose work Pearl’s ap-
proach claims to include agree.53 We also note that the
SCM framework makes intrinsic use of counterfactuals,
and many epidemiologists, statisticians, philosophers and
others remain unconvinced that any theory about causality
that is solely based on counterfactual analysis can be ‘com-
plete’ and cover all possible situations and approaches to
causality in epidemiology.49 It is not our task in this paper
to enter into that debate, but rather to address the limita-
tions of the RPOA approach.
We also wish to clarify again that we do not object to
the use of the tools of the RPOA that they have in common
with broader approaches, nor doubt their usefulness. We
object, rather, to the insistence that they are the only or
even the best tools for assessing causality. RPOA precepts
remain valuable for thinking about designing, analysing,
and interpreting single analytical studies within a single
framework of causality.
Conclusions
Causal inference in both principle and practice will con-
tinue to exhibit characteristics that the RPOA does not
capture or explain: the ruling-out of alternative hypotheses
by interlocking pictures that amount to more than the sum
of their parts, and with sometimes crucial roles for indi-
vidually weak pieces of evidence. The RPOA focuses on
the way causal questions are posed within studies. But
causality is almost never established from a single study.
At best, a single study will prove decisive against a certain
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evidential background, without which it might not have
been decisive. The value of evidence is context sensitive,
and not dependent only on the nature of the study. The im-
portant causal questions are asked not within studies, but
between them.
Although theoretical epidemiology makes progress and
improves practice, a mismatch remains. As Greenland puts
it:
The primary challenge in producing an accurate causal
inference or effect estimate is most often that of inte-
grating a diverse collection of ragged evidence into pre-
dictions to an as-yet unobserved target. This process
does not fit into formal causal-inference methodologies
currently in use, . . . .54
‘Ragged evidence’ is the environment in which epidemi-
ology lives. Formula 1 cars may be the best in the idealized
environment of a racetrack, but to say that they are the
‘best’ cars would be misleading, since they are useless in al-
most every other situation. We should teach epidemiology
students how to deal with the world of ragged evidence, ra-
ther than celebrating methods that work only in an impos-
sibly idealized world. Future epidemiologists should learn:
(i) that causal inference remains a judgment based on inte-
gration of diverse types or evidence; (ii) diverse strategies
to assess causality by ruling out alternatives, such as tri-
angulation, negative controls and interlocking evidence
from other types of science; (iii) the elements of all types of
epidemiological study designs, inclusive of those types of
design that do not match the ideal counterfactual situation;
and (iv) to reflect critically on whether potential biases
matter, e.g. for follow-up studies of prevalently exposed
persons, or in setting up case-control studies in dynamic
populations.55 Otherwise, a new generation of epidemiolo-
gists may think that they cannot solve any problem except
if data exist that are close to an idealized RCT, and they
may be hesitant to use other methods.
In conclusion, causal inference in both principle and
practice will continue to involve integrating diverse types
of knowledge. At best, a single study will prove decisive
against a certain evidential background, without which it
might not have been decisive. We will always need multiple
and preferably diverse studies, often from diverse branches
of science—as well as studies about evidence that is the
consequence of (alternative) hypotheses. For scientific and
public health decision making, all of the available evidence
should be considered, as exemplified in Bradford Hill’s
viewpoints.1 It is scientifically invalid to restrict epidemi-
ology to a RPOA paradigm, wherein research is restricted
to hypotheses where it is possible to conceive of a (hypo-
thetical) intervention. In particular: (i) RPOA is a poor de-
scriptive account of causal inference in epidemiology, as
illustrated by various historical episodes; (ii) RPOA is a
poor normative account of causal inference in epidemi-
ology because it cannot explain how approaches which do
not ‘fit’ it work; (iii) various other approaches to causal in-
ference are available and have been successfully used which
do not seem to make such imperious claims as does the
RPOA, and which are incompatible with it.
The scientific process is much more messy, interesting
and productive than the RPOA approach. Modern causal
inference theory is valuable, but it is not enough. We there-
fore propose the continued use of pluralistic views of caus-
ality and of the assessment of causality.
Acknowledgements
We are indebted to extensive discussions and comments on earlier
versions by Victor Gijsbers, Patrick Bossuyt, Maria Glymour, Clark
Glymour, Madelyn Glymour, Sharon Schwartz, Miguel Hernan,
Nancy Krieger, Sander Greenland, Tyler VanderWeele, Ben Smart,
Judea Pearl and several reviewers. The Centre for Global NCDs is
supported by the Wellcome Trust Institutional Strategic Support
Fund, 097834/Z/11/B.
Conflicts of interest: The authors declare no financial conflict of
interest.
References
1. Hill AB. The Enviroment and Disease: Association of
Causation? Proc R Soc Med 1965;58:295–300.
2. Bird A. The epistemological function of Hill’s criteria. Prev Med
2011;53:242–45.
3. Hernan MA, Robins JM. Causal Inference. July 2015. http://
cdn1.sph.harvard.edu/wp-content/uploads/sites/1268/2015/07/
hernanrobins_v1.10.29.pdf. (14 August 2015, date last
accessed).
4. Hernan MA. Invited commentary: hypothetical interventions to
define causal effects – afterthought or prerequisite? Am J
Epidemiol 2005;162:618–20; discussion 621–12.
5. Hernan MA, Taubman SL. Does obesity shorten life? The im-
portance of well-defined interventions to answer causal ques-
tions. Int J Obes (Lond) 2008;32Suppl 3):S8–14.
6. Rothman KJ, Greenland S, Lash TL. Modern Epidemiology. 3rd
edn. Philadelphia, PA: Wolters Kluwer, Lippincott, Williams &
Wilkins, 2008.
7. VanderWeele TJ, Hernan MA. Causal effects and natural laws:
Towards a conceptualization of causal counterfactuals for non-
manipulable exposures, with application to the effects of race
and sex. In: Berzuini C, Dawid A, Bernardinelli L (eds).
Causality: Statistical Perspective and Applications. Hoboken,
NJ: John Wiley, 2012, p. 101–13.
8. VanderWeele T. Explanation in causal inference: methods for
mediation and interaction. New York, NY: Oxford University
Press, 2015.
9. Halpern JY, Pearl J. Causes and Explanations: A Structural Models
Approach. Part 1: Causes. Br J Philos Sci 2005;56:843–87.
10. Pearl J. Causality: Models, Reasoning and Inference. 2nd edn.
Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2009.
10 International Journal of Epidemiology, 2016, Vol. 0, No. 0
 at London School of H
ygiene &
 Tropical M
edicine on A
pril 27, 2016
http://ije.oxfordjournals.org/
D
ow
nloaded from
 
11. Bollen KA, Pearl J. In: Morgan SL (ed). Eight Myths about
Causality and Structural Equation Models. New York, NY:
Springer, 2013:301–28.
12. Lilienfeld AM. Epidemiological methods and inferences in studies
of non-infectious diseases. Public Health Rep 1957;72:51–60.
13. Lewis D. Counterfactuals. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University
Press, 1973.
14. Lewis D. Counterfactuals and Comparative Possibility. J Philos
Log 1973;2:418–46.
15. Lewis D. Causation. J Philos 1973;70:556–67.
16. Lewis D. Counterfactual Dependence and Time’s Arrow. Nouˆs
1979;13:455–76.
17. Rubin DB. Estimating causal effects of treatments in randomized
and nonrandomized studies. J Educ Psychol 1974;56:688–701.
18. Spirtes P, Glymour C, Scheines R. Causation, Prediction, and
Search. New York, NY: Springer, 1993.
19. Pearl J. Causality: Models, Reasoning and Inference. 1st edn.
Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2000.
20. Robins JM, Hernan MA, Brumback B. Marginal structural mod-
els and causal inference in epidemiology. Epidemiology
2000;11:550–60.
21. Hernan MA, Brumback B, Robins JM. Marginal structural mod-
els to estimate the causal effect of zidovudine on the survival of
HIV-positive men. Epidemiology 2000;11:561–70.
22. Lewis D. On the Plurality of Worlds. Hoboken, NJ: Wiley, 2001.
23. Greenland S, Robins JM, Pearl J. Confounding and collapsibility
in causal inference. Stat Sci 1999;14:29–46.
24. Beebee H, Hitchcock C, Menzies P (eds). The Oxford Handbook
of Causation. Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 2009.
25. Schaffer J. Contrastive Causation. Philos Rev 2005;114:297–28.
26. Woodward J. Making Things Happen: A Theory of Causal
Explanation. Oxford, UK: Oxford Unviversity Press, 2003.
27. Greenland S. Epidemiologic measures and policy formulation: les-
sons from potential outcomes. Emerg Themes Epidemiol 2005;2:5.
28. VanderWeele TJ, Robinson WR. On the causal interpretation of
race in regressions adjusting for confounding and mediating vari-
ables. Epidemiology 2014;25:473–84.
29. Rothman KJ. Six persistent research misconceptions. J Gen
Intern Med 2014;29:1060–64.
30. Stamler J, Neaton JD. The Multiple Risk Factor Intervention
Trial (MRFIT) – importance then and now. JAMA
2008;300:1343–45.
31. Broadbent A. Causation and Prediction in Epidemiology: A
guide to the ‘Methodological Revolution’. Stud Hist Philos Biol
Biomed Sci 2015;54:72–80.
32. Staessen JA, Wang JG, Thijs L. Cardiovascular protection and
blood pressure reduction: a meta-analysis. Lancet 2001;358:
1305–15.
33. Carmelli D, Page WF. Twenty-four year mortality in World War
II US male veteran twins discordant for cigarette smoking. Int J
Epidemiol 1996;25:554–59.
34. Cornfield J, Haenszel W, Hammond EC, Lilienfeld AM, Shimkin
MB, Wynder EL. Smoking and lung cancer: recent evidence and a
discussion of some questions. J Natl Cancer Inst 1959;22:173–203.
35. Vandenbroucke JP. Commentary: ‘Smoking and lung cancer’ –
the embryogenesis of modern epidemiology. Int J Epidemiol
2009;38:1193–96.
36. Haack S. Manifesto of a passionate moderate. Chicago, IL:
Chicago University Press, 1998, p. 95.
37. Lipton P. Evidence to the Best Explanation. 2nd edn. London
and New York: Routledge, 2004.
38. Broadbent A. Philosophy of Epidemiology. Basingstoke, UK:
Palgrave Macmillan, 2013.
39. Broadbent A. Stability as a Stable Category in Medical
Epistemology. J Appl Philos 2015. In press.
40. Cornfield J. Principles of research. Am J Ment Defic
1959;64:240–52.
41. Bryman AE. Triangulation and measurement. Department of
Social Sciences, Loughborough University 2015. Available from:
http://www.referenceworld.com/sage/socialscience/
triangulation.pdf.
42. Schneeweiss S, Seeger JD, Landon J, Walker AM. Aprotinin dur-
ing coronary-artery bypass grafting and risk of death. N Engl J
Med 2008;358:771–83.
43. Lipsitch M, Tchetgen Tchetgen E, Cohen T. Negative controls: a
tool for detecting confounding and bias in observational studies.
Epidemiology 2010;21:383–88.
44. Howe LD, Matijasevich A, Tilling K et al. Maternal smoking
during pregnancy and offspring trajectories of height and adipos-
ity: comparing maternal and paternal associations. Int J
Epidemiol 2012;41:722–32.
45. Denissenko MF, Pao A, Tang M, Pfeifer GP. Preferential forma-
tion of benzo[a]pyrene adducts at lung cancer mutational hot-
spots in P53. Science 1996;274:430–32.
46. Vandenbroucke JP. 175th anniversary lecture. Medical journals
and the shaping of medical knowledge. Lancet 1998;352:
2001–06.
47. Pearce NE, Blair A, Vineis P et al. IARC Monographs: 40 Years
of Evaluating Carcinogenic Hazards to Humans. Environ Health
Perspect 2015. doi: 10.1289/ehp.1409149
48. Pearce N. Traditional epidemiology, modern epidemiology, and
public health. Am J Public Health 1996;86:678–83.
49. Glymour C, Glymour MR. Commentary: race and sex are
causes. Epidemiology 2014;25:488–90.
50. Hall N. Two concepts of causation. In: Collins J, Hall N, Paul
LA (eds). Causation and Counterfactuals. Cambridge, MA: MIT
Press, 2004, p. 225–76.
51. Godfrey-Smith P. Causal Pluralism. In: Beebee H, Hitchcock C,
Menzies P (eds). The Oxford Handbook of Causation. Oxford,
UK: Oxford University Press, 2009, p. 326–40.
52. Pearl J. Causal inference in statistics: An overview. Stat Surv
2009;3:96–146.
53. Dawid P. The Decision Theoretic Approach to Causal Inference.
In: Berzuini C, Dawid P, Bernardinelli L (eds). Causality:
Statistical Perspectives and Applications. Hoboken, NJ: Wiley,
2012, p. 25–42.
54. Greenland S. Causal inference as a prediction problem. In:
Berzuini C, Dawid P, Bernardinelli L (eds). Causality, Statistical
Perspectives and Applications. Hoboken, NJ: Wiley, 2012, p.
44–52.
55. Vandenbroucke JP, Pearce N. POINT: Incident exposures,
prevalent exposures, and causal inference: Limiting studies to
persons who are followed from first exposure onwards may dam-
age epidemiology. Am J Epidemiol 2015;182:826–33.
International Journal of Epidemiology, 2016, Vol. 0, No. 0 11
 at London School of H
ygiene &
 Tropical M
edicine on A
pril 27, 2016
http://ije.oxfordjournals.org/
D
ow
nloaded from
 
